You do also use that sensor but it goes in the rear where the green plug is. You can also go to the junkyard and grab a Colant temp sensor off of any 1st gen , protege or escort. I don't see you having any problems with that.
Those damn things are notorious for breaking. Comment Post Cancel. When you turn your car on Yes, still have it. It was my attempt to immortalize you in verse. A Protege driver named Brock Once said 7 seconds he'd clock. So his engine he goosed With much too much boost, And drove a rod through his block. You may want to look into that also. Here are the part numbers for it.. Check into that and see what you get. Last edited by bruce95fmla ; , PM.
I'm referring to the one that goes here -. When my ECTS went my temp gauge read the in the proper temperature range.
Last edited by Protoss ; , PM. And where is the temp sensor? Under the lower intake manifold? The golden sensor is the other green thing that is under the body of the arrow, almost right below you PCV breather. Even though he needs to replace the one he broke, he may as well replace the ECTS since he has already purchased it..
Just use a 21 mm deep socket to pull it out. Autozone seems to be giving him the ECTS, but he needs to replace the one he broke. I am thinking autozone may be listing the 1 wire thermostat housing sensor as a temp switch.
Tell them to give that to you in a box and check that out if it is the right one. But you need to replace that temp switch. It's listed above, just give them one of the part numbers. All rights reserved. This document contained the following:. The same vehicle from the right, maximum gun elevation. Trials began on December 6th with determining the gunnery characteristics. Good stability and satisfactory groupings were observed. Overall, the vehicle was deemed successful.
The gun mount was less bulky, the trails did not protrude, and the travel lock was better. The fighting compartment of the SU Mobility trials began on December 9th.
The SU broke down and did not take part. As for the SU, mechanical issues did not bug it in the first days. However, enlarged mudguards had to be installed, since the snow that was being kicked up made it impossible for the driver to see. The same was done to the SU, which was going through trials in parallel.
On the 11th, after the march began, an oil leak into the cooling system was found. The issue was corrected, and the march continued. The SPG travelled km during trials, but greater problems were coming.
A serious breakdown of the right engine's gearbox occurred on the th kilometer. A portion of the mobility trials had to be done on one engine. A similar breakdown happened on the SU after km. The SU failed trials. The commander's station, showing the 9-R radio. The protruding gun trail can also be seen. It got in the way of the crew's work.
The conclusions made on December 18th said the following:. A technical meeting took place at factory 38 on December 15th. Issues regarding the ZIS-3 were discussed, including ideas for how to lighten the system.
A kg counterweight was installed to compensate for the mantlet. The travel lock issue was also discussed. The side observation devices were removed, and only the commander retained his periscope. The driver's observation device became immobile. The situation with the gearbox was interesting. In it, he blamed the poor gearbox gear switch synchronizer on the defects of the SU According to him, poor quality assembly of the SU and SU was the cause of the issues in the trials.
Ginzburg was partially correct. Experimental prototypes built in wartime often had issues with quality of assembly. For instance, poor quality of assembly was what killed the KV in its initial form.
However, the KV had plenty of design flaws. The same was true for the SU and SU The chief designer should have taken note of the similar defects on both prototypes. However, the GKO decree already ordered the vehicles to be put into production. Ginzburg thought that it would be enough to correct the issues later.
For now, getting rid of manufacturing errors would be enough. Claiming that similar issues were observed on the T and T, the chief designer set off to Kirov to personally oversee the assembly process of the prototypes. This approach was effective. Even though training units reported mechanical defects in January of , none of them had to do with the gearbox. It seems that the defect was defeated. In reality, Ginzburg just signed his death sentence, as his efforts only postponed the widespread breakdowns of the gearbox on his SPGs.
While trials of the SU and SU continued, factory 38 was getting ready for production. Externally, there were no differences from the prototype. The difference was in a lack of side observation devices and a few other improvements. As for the SU, its fate was a sad one. It was simply omitted from production plans. The first fighting compartment roof design.
Reliability trials of SU L were performed on December st. The SPG drove for km without a gearbox breakdown. It seems that the issue was indeed in the quality of manufacturing, and improvements to the process solved it once and for all. SU in Teterevino, Kursk oblast, June This is an early vehicle with no roof.
The most famous change to the SPG, implemented during the production, was the introduction of a roof. At first, the SPG was open from the top, like its predecessors and competitors.
Correspondence found in the economics archive RGAE indicates that Stalin requested a roof personally. The 6 mm thick roof had three openings for periscopes and an opening for a panoramic sight. The roof was introduced because the crew in the fighting compartment was vulnerable to bullets and shell splinters. The correctness of the roof was proven by the first battles that the SU participated in.
The Volkhov Front, where these SPGs were first used, sent a message requesting that roofs be installed. All vehicles looked like this starting with March of Roofs were scheduled to be introduced into production in January of , but due to a lack of 6 mm plate a closed fighting compartment SU was not produced in January or February.
According to an order of the Main Artillery Directorate, factory 38 was supposed to produce only SPGs with roofs starting with March 1st. Judging by photos of March production vehicles, this order was carried out.
At least SUs, over a third of overall production, were built without roofs. Some authors write that roofs were removed due to ventilation issues, but that is not the case.
In addition to a roof, March-June production vehicles can be distinguished from earlier ones by the headlight, which migrated to the front of the casemate. All photos of the SU without a roof show this headlight on the left fender. This is a mark of early production vehicles. The same with fighting compartment hatches open. The externally visible parts of the SU, which was called SU by that point, were finalized by April. Some internal components were later changed, but that did not affect its look.
One of the solutions to the cramped fighting compartment was the ZIS-8 gun mount. It was designed by the design department of factory 92 under the direction of engineer Abramov. The more compact gun mount got rid of the trails inside the fighting compartment. This improved crew conditions, reduced mass, saved on parts, and allowed the SPG to carry 14 more 76 mm shells. Trials showed good results, and factory 92 recommended that the mount be installed in production.
However, the star of the SU was beginning to set. The ZIS-8 remained as a prototype. Production of the SU began without much difficulty, but hit a number of issues in January of Instead of vehicles that were expected, only 40 were delivered.
Other quotas that year were also not met: vehicles were delivered in February instead of , same in March. In April, factory 38 met the reduced quota of vehicles. The factory was penalized financially due to their failure. However, production of other SPGs experiences similar problems. A common issue with many Soviet wartime production vehicles was the quality of assembly. Out of the 26 SUs that were received 14 of them were functional, 9 were being repaired, and 3 were sent to factory 40 in Mytishi.
Widespread gearbox failures were not yet observed, but there were plenty of other issues. Repair brigades managed to deal with engine overcooling problems due to an absence of a regulator in the cooling system. A big issue was that the right engine started up first, but the electric generator was attached to the left engine.
This led to the batteries being discharged. A number of complaints about the welding on the carriers of internal components were made.
Finally, there were issues with the crews not knowing their vehicles, which also led to breakdowns. SU accepted by crew, spring of Due to the issues of this vehicle, the crew might not have made it to the front lines.
Lipgart, in attendance. Quality of assembly was once again blamed for the gearbox defects, both with the gearbox itself and the vehicle overall. There were already some doubts about that being the root cause of the issue. Another point of proof was that a new gear change mechanism was implemented. The system with two gearboxes that were switched with one lever was unreliable.
Nevertheless, Ginzburg still denied that the main source of the issue was the system he designed. On February 12th, Lipgart sent a letter to the People's Commissariat of Medium Machinebuilding, where he outlined his opinion about the issue. According to him, the issue wasn't with the gearbox. In his mind, the main issue was that the gearboxes were not meant to be used with a parallel engine design.
The first SU went into battle in February of According to it, the 4th and 5th batteries of the SAP were equipped with SUs 4 vehicles per battery and 3 more batteries were armed with SUs the battery commander's vehicle was also a SU According to a report by the th SAP, three of its SUs suffered from breakdowns of gearbox gears.
The overall design of the transmission was also criticized. However, the SU proved itself a valuable combat unit. According to documents, the SUs of the th SAP fought better, but this is, perhaps, a matter of comparison with the SG, which broke down even more frequently. The concept of a light assault gun was clearly successful. However, clouds started to gather over the vehicle and Ginzburg by March of The biggest issues with gearboxes started happening in February-March of , when true mass production of the SU began.
Only 35 vehicles left factory 38 in January, but 94 in February and 96 in March. Alarm bells started ringing in late February of This is before a roof added extra mass to the existing 11 tons. View from the front. Note the headlight that moved up to the casemate.
The situation was catastrophic. However, action was taken in Kirov. An investigation performed by the factory 38 design bureau without Ginzburg's participation in March of allowed the issue to be partially mitigated. Schukin's suggestions consisted of reinforcement of the bottom plate, installation of a flexible clutch, and adding rubber shock absorbers to the engines. Nevertheless, factory management was directly indicating that the parallel engine layout was to blame.
The design bureau could not guarantee a complete solution to all problems.
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